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ABSTRACT 
As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, 
conventional forces are placed in unconventional roles outside their traditional high 
intensity military specialty.  By showing that there are analogies between organized 
crime and insurgencies, further studies can be conducted on the applicability of modern 
law enforcement tactics to military operations.   
This thesis shows that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between 
organized crime families and insurgencies.  They both organize themselves as secret 
societies with similar hierarchical command structures for both survival and operational 
needs.  Both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from 
authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military.   
The similarity between organized crime and insurgent organizations provides a 
broad basis for further study in other areas.  The FBI and other law enforcement agencies 
have been combating organized crime families for decades and have used proven 
techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping to expose 
organized crime’s largely invisible network.  Based on the similarities between organized 
crime families and insurgent organizations, law enforcement tactics and their 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to show that there are valid analogies between La 
Cosa Nostra crime families in America and insurgencies.  This study will specifically 
focus on the similarities in organizational structure and secrecy of the La Cosa Nostra 
crime families of New York and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) of the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers in 1957.  By 
showing that there are valid analogies between both organized crime in America and 
insurgency organizations, further studies can be conducted as to the applicability of 
modern law enforcement tactics to military operations and their feasibility in the Army’s 
emerging counterinsurgency doctrine.  By showing the types of organizational 
similarities that exist between organized crime in America and insurgencies, the 
possibility exists to expand the current counterinsurgency doctrine to include anti-
organized crime techniques that are relevant to the tactical situation.   
Today, the Army doctrinally identifies the analogies between organized crime and 
insurgencies in its new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 
which states, “[e]xperience countering organized crime is especially relevant to COIN, as 
most insurgent groups are more similar to organized crime in their organizational 
structure and relations with the population than they are to military units.”1  This thesis 
will focus on the organizational command structure and the secrecy of these 
organizations. The hierarchical command structure of La Cosa Nostra crime families in 
New York in 1983 and 1987 is analogous to that of the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 
1957.  In addition, there is a dependent relationship between both organizations and their 
populations for secrecy and survival.   
Although terrorist organizations and insurgencies have dramatic differences in 
ideology and backgrounds, there are some similarities in the basic networked structure 
between the two.  Based on the outward appearances of both organized crime and 
insurgencies, one would assume that there are direct relationships between the two and a 
                                                 
1 United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, Washington:  U.S. Government 
Printing Office, June 2006, 6-19. 
2 
direct applicability of anti-organized crime techniques to counter terrorism strategies.  
This, however, is not entirely valid and is another area for possible study.   
B. BACKGROUND 
As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, 
conventional forces such as Infantry, Armor, and Artillery units are placed in 
unconventional roles outside their traditional high intensity military specialty.  The 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review demonstrates this shift in military operations in the preface 
as it outlines the Defense Department’s change in military emphasis, “[f]rom major 
conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations.”2  The 
QDR further demonstrates the change in military capabilities as it outlines the Defense 
Department’s operational strategy in the statement, “[m]ultipurpose forces to train, equip, 
and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular 
warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”3  The 
Department of Defense acknowledges the need for troops with a broader perspective and 
capabilities in the war ahead. 
Combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are facing a changing and adaptive enemy 
without complete knowledge of how to break down the insurgency’s organizational 
structure and eliminate the enemy’s invisibility within the indigenous population.  As 
Colonel William Peers, of the OSS Detachment 101 in World War II stated in the book 
Behind the Burma Road “[t]he guerrilla’s first job is to remain anonymous, to live among 
the enemy.”4  Combat experience and Company Commanders in Iraq have noticed the 
similarities between the Iraqi insurgency and organized crime, although largely as a result 
of popularized films and television that most troops enjoy while deployed.  Despite the 
problems that exist with the popularized version of organized crime, there are some valid 
analogies between the two types of organizations.  Although many commanders are  
 
 
                                                 
2 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, February 6, 2006, vii, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf; Internet; accessed October 20, 2006. 
3 Ibid., 23. 
4 William Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 
1963), 12. 
3 
figuring out how to fight the insurgency within their sectors, units as a whole are never 
truly able to penetrate the network’s hierarchy and get inside the enemy’s decision 
making cycle.   
Only recently has the Army developed a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq and 
drafted a new counterinsurgency doctrine in the field manual FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency.  With a new counterinsurgency doctrine developing, conventional 
forces are attempting the challenge of extending their conventional mindset to irregular 
warfare techniques.  Counterinsurgency doctrine is a recent and emerging skill set within 
the conventional Army forces and is being developed through historical study and combat 
experience in the field.  Due to this emerging need for information and counterinsurgency 
doctrine, this thesis will focus on organizational analogies between organized crime in 
America and a historical insurgency in order to provide a better basis for analysis and 
comparison.   
By analyzing historical data from La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York 
and comparing them to the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957, this thesis shows that 
there are organizational and conceptual analogies between the two.  Both insurgencies 
and organized crime families organize themselves as secret societies with similar 
hierarchical command structures.  This is done both for survival within a population and 
for operational needs based on the environment, such as a particular ethnically 
homogeneous neighborhood in either New York or in the Casbah of Algiers.  For 
survival, both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from 
authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military.  They 
must also maintain anonymity within the civilian population in order to conduct their 
business.   
Organized crime in America and its study provides evidence and useful insights 
into counterinsurgency strategy.  The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been 
combating organized crime families for decades, however, the study and understanding 
of organized crime academically was not fully realized until the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s.  The FBI has used proven techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and  
 
4 
electronic eavesdropping and other operations within the laws and regulations of the 
United States, to expose the criminal organization’s largely invisible network and provide 
evidence for criminal prosecution.  
The FBI’s 2004 to 2009 Strategic Plan shows the agency’s recent focus on 
organized crime as one of its strategic goals in the statement, “La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and 
Italian organized crime enterprises still pose a significant threat and will continue to 
influence the political and economic structure of the United States. . .”5  The FBI’s 
website further provides evidence of the organization’s commitment to fighting organized 
crime in the statement, “[o]ur ultimate goal is the elimination of the LCN [La Cosa 
Nostra] as the most dominant organized criminal enterprise in the United States.”6  The 
FBI’s website also shows the agency’s strategic objective in its fight against organized 
crime in the statement,  
The FBI's fight against organized crime is unlike other criminal programs. 
Instead of focusing on these crimes as individual events, the FBI's 
Organized Crime Program targets the entire organization responsible for a 
variety of criminal activities. The FBI has found that even if key 
individuals in an organization are removed, the depth and financial 
strength of the organization often allows the enterprise to continue.7 
The FBI’s strategic objective also demonstrates the importance of focusing on the entire 
organization rather than individual members whose removal could still allow the 
organization to continue to operate despite losses at the top or bottom of its structure. 
Although organized crime families can be viewed as largely parasitic within a 
given society, without a stated ideology, and with different societal goals than insurgent 
organizations, their primary means of survival is the relative invisibility to law 
enforcement within a population.  As Joseph Pistone, a former special agent in the FBI, 
better known as Donnie Brasco, testified before the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
in April 1988, “[t]he neighborhood where the wiseguys [sic] regularly hang out is always 
                                                 
5 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic Plan 2004 to 2009, 51. available from 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006. 
6 “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Website [Website]; available from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm; Internet; accessed 
October 12, 2006. 
7 “About Organized Crime,” Federal Bureau of Investigation Website [Website]; available from 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aboutocs.htm ; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006. 
5 
aware of their presence and their positions in the Mafia.  Whether from fear or respect, 
the neighbors protect the wiseguys from police surveillance.  The wiseguys in return will 
help out the neighborhood by ensuring that no disorganized or street crime operates in the 
area.”8  Joseph Pistone worked as an undercover FBI agent and infiltrated the Bonanno 
family in New York.9  He provided law enforcement with much needed evidence and 
information on the inner workings of organized crime activities in that city. His insights 
into the organizational structure of organized crime families and their relationship to the 
population have credibility unlike that of a normal informant.  He did not use his 
information in order to gain favor with authority figures in return for leniency.  This gives 
his testimony impartiality as well as a uniqueness given his position within organized 
crime and as a law enforcement officer.  Joseph Pistone’s testimony demonstrates that by 
protecting organized crime from law enforcement, the local population receives 
protection from other criminal activities in return; in other words, organized crime 
provides the local population a measure of security.   
Insurgent organizations use the same techniques in order to maintain secrecy and 
gain legitimacy among local populations.  As Andrew Krepinevich states in his book The 
Army and Vietnam, “the support of the people is a measure of the insurgents’ ability to 
control the people, whether through their willing cooperation or as the result of threats, 
acts of terrorism, or the physical occupation of their community.”10  He continues by 
stating, “[t]he bottom line for a successful guerrilla warfare operation, then, is a primary 
support system anchored on the population.”11  Krepinevich’s description of Vietnamese 
insurgents provides evidence for the importance of local population support to 
insurgencies.  Both organized crime and insurgencies rely on the population for support 
and secrecy in order to survive and conduct their day to day operations. 
This study will purposely focus on organized crime families in America and 
exclude gangs and other transnational criminal organizations.  It will draw on previous 
                                                 
8 Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Organized Crime:  25 Years After 
Valachi, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 205. 
9 Ibid., 202. 




and ongoing research in these fields to compare organized crime families with insurgent 
organizations.  The analogy of organized crime families and terrorist organizations is 
another area for possible further research. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on the La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York and the 
ALN in the Casbah due to the amount of data on each organization’s structure.  This 
thesis will use both primary and secondary sources to show the valid analogies between 
organized crime in America and insurgent organizations.  The data for the La Cosa 
Nostra crime families in New York was primarily found in the 1967 Presidential Task 
Force on Organized Crime Report, the 1983 hearing before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, the 1988 hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and 
in the books and journal articles published by leading academics in the field.  The data 
for the Senate committees was compiled by the FBI, the New York State Police, and 
local law enforcement agencies.  It provides the basis for the command structures of 
organized crime families.  The transcripts of the hearings provide a unique first-hand 
account of organized crime activities from informants, former organized crime members, 
and undercover FBI agents.  This data, along with hierarchy charts provided before 
Congress, is used to show the hierarchical command structure of La Cosa Nostra crime 
families in New York.   
The data on the ALN was collected primarily from Alistair Horne’s book A 
Savage War of Peace:  Algeria 1954-1962, Roger Trinquier’s book Modern Warfare:  A 
French View of Counterinsurgency, and General Jacque Massu’s book La Vraie Bataille 
D’Alger.  General Massu’s book provides a unique perspective on the Battle of Algiers 
from his position as the French commander and is generally defensive of the French 
tactics and techniques used against the FLN during the battle.  The data listed in each of 
these books provides the basis for the command structure and hierarchy of the ALN in 
1956 and 1957. 
The data used in this study was collected from the government’s perspective and 
not from either organized crime families or the ALN.  The secrecy and clandestine nature 
of these organizations logically limits the amount of data available from within the  
 
7 
organizations.  From this perspective, the data can be considered one-sided, however, this 
thesis has used terms and structures that are generally accepted in the field of study to 
filter the possible bias.   
Chapter II will give a brief background of organized crime and its accepted terms 
and definitions, and describes the leading methods of analysis.  Chapter III will focus on 
the five La Cosa Nostra crime Families of New York and their command structure.  
Chapter IV will focus on a brief history of the Battle of Algiers and the command 
structure of the ALN.  Chapter V will show the valid analogies in organizational 
command structure and secrecy between the organized crime families and the ALN, and 
suggest areas for possible further study. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The study of organized crime and the ways to outline and understand its structure 
are directly related to the perspective and skills needed by combat commanders in the 
fight against insurgent organizations.  U.S. troops on the ground can use the command 
structure of organized crime families to outline the structure of insurgent organizations. 
With this knowledge, commanders can get inside the insurgency’s decision making cycle 
and disrupt its operations based on their knowledge of the organization’s structure and 
the relationship that exists between its members.  
The current systems in place to outline insurgency networks within the 
conventional Army lie largely within the military intelligence community and are outside 
the daily knowledge of ground commanders and troops in the field.  Unfortunately, the “I 
have a secret” system within the Army remains largely in effect and information is stove-
piped between organizations and not shared with people in the right places to use it.  By 
demonstrating the analogies to organized crime, U.S. troops can not only gather 
intelligence during day to day operations within the neighborhoods of the populace, but 
outline insurgent networks at the lowest level by using techniques freely available from 
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9 
II. ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 
A. BACKGROUND 
La Cosa Nostra, the Mafia, and organized crime have historically meant different 
things during different parts of history, however, today they are almost used 
synonymously outside the academic and law enforcement world.  Popularized television 
and movies helps promote this lack of knowledge and understanding among the general 
population.  Joseph Albini, one of the founding fathers of the study of organized crime, 
describes the lack of understanding of the term mafia in his book The American Mafia:  
Genesis of a Legend, “[d]espite constant exposure to the term, there are few who can give 
a logically consistent, reasonably lucid definition or interpretation of what the term stands 
for.”12  The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime also pointed out the lack 
of knowledge among the American public regarding organized crime and its effects in the 
statement, “[o]rganized crime affects the lives of millions of Americans, but because it 
desperately preserves its invisibility many, perhaps most, Americans are not aware how 
they are affected, or even that they affected at all.”13 This lack of knowledge is still true 
today, aggravated by the expansion of criminal networks over multiple criminal 
enterprises and ethnicities, and the expansion of international criminal and terrorist 
networks in the information age.   
This study will focus on La Cosa Nostra as the basis for a national criminal 
syndicate of organized crime families and specifically the traditional crime families of 
New York.  The reason for selecting La Cosa Nostra is the American nature of this 
organization and the amount of academic, governmental, and law enforcement data 
available on its structure.  Before analyzing the families in New York and their 
similarities to insurgent organizations, it is useful to review the brief history of all three 
terms and their origin in American culture and academe. 
                                                 
12 Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York:  Meredith Corporation, 
1971), 83. 
13 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1. 
10 
It is also important to note that although the word “family” is often, used it does 
not necessarily mean that all members are of a particular genealogical lineage.  The term 
“family” refers to the organization as a whole.  Although direct genealogical relations are 
important, they are not the defining basis for membership within the organization.  This 
study will use the term in an organizational manner in order to minimize the confusion 
and accurately portray particular organized crime organizations. 
B. “MAFIA” 
The term “Mafia” is generally accepted by academics as a Sicilian or Italian term 
and distinctively separate from the term “La Cosa Nostra.”  The precise origin of the term 
“Mafia” has been debated among academics for decades and still remains controversial as 
Francis Ianni, a social anthropologist and leading academic in the study of social 
relationships in organized crime, states that, “[t]he origins of the word mafia are lost in 
history.  Some of the theories of its origin are patently absurd.”14  Ianni does, however, 
provide two useful meanings of the term in his book A Family Business.  He provides a 
detailed study of an organized crime family through several generations in the United 
States as well as its historical origins in southern Italy and Sicily,  
Mafia is a word which has at least two distinct meanings to the Sicilians.  
When the word is used as an adjective, it describes a state of mind, a sense 
of pride, a philosophy of life, and a style of behavior which Sicilians 
recognize immediately. . . It bespeaks the man who is known and 
respected because of his ability to get things done. . . the word Mafia when 
used as a noun, clearly denotes such an organization as well as such a state 
of mind.15 
Ianni shows the difficulty of finding the origins of the word “Mafia.”  He also 
demonstrates that there is a distinctive local meaning to the term and that this dual 
meaning presents problems for making accurate studies without a clear understanding of 
the term and its usage in different contexts.   
Despite the debate over the origins and meaning of the term “Mafia,” most 
academics will agree that such an organization historically existed and possibly still exits 
in southern Italy and Sicily today.  The immigration of Italians and Sicilians to America 
                                                 
14 Francis Ianni, A Family Business (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 25. 
15 Ibid., 24-25. 
11 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most likely brought the term and 
possibly the structure of the organization with them.  Ianni concedes this point in the 
statement, “[i]t is possible that southern Italian immigrants in America resurrected the 
Mafia model, under the stress of ghetto poverty and lawlessness, to organize their 
movement out of the slum and into crime.”16  The Mafia as it existed or still exists in 
these countries provides another avenue of study for analogies to insurgent organizations 
due to the different role the Mafia played within these societies.  The organization 
replaced and opposed governmental control and is separate from that of organized crime 
families in the United States and in New York, as Ianni describes, “[a]s a kin-centered 
social system, the Mafia is Sicilian society in microcosm.”17 
Ianni’s book and his studies of the Mafia organization prior to 1972 attempted to 
prove that a link between the organization in Sicily and Italy and the United States was 
unlikely, “[e]very government committee investigating organized crime in America has 
pointed to some organizational link between Italian-American crime syndicates and the 
Sicilian Mafia.  But anyone searching for the link finds problems on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  In the first place, by no means all of the reputed members of Cosa Nostra are 
Sicilians.”18  Currently, however, the FBI recognizes the existence of a Sicilian Mafia in 
the United States.  It confirms this on its official public website,  
Since their appearance in the 1800s, the Italian criminal societies known 
as the Mafia have infiltrated the social and economic fabric of Italy, and 
now impact the world. They are some of the most notorious and 
widespread of all criminal societies. Those currently active in the United 
States are the Sicilian Mafia, Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia, Ndrangheta or 
Calabrian Mafia, and Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown. The 
FBI refers to them as ‘Italian Organized Crime’ (IOC).19 
Despite the debate concerning the international link of the Mafia and its place in 
America, the FBI does recognize that the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra” are 
                                                 
16 Francis Ianni, A Family Business (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 11. 
17 Ibid., 41. 
18 Ibid., 15. 
19“Italian Organized Crime,” Federal Bureau of Investigation Website [Website]; available from 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcn/ioc.htm; Internet; accessed October 25, 2006.  
12 
different, “[a]lthough the La Cosa Nostra has its roots in Italian Organized Crime (IOC), 
it has been a separate organization for many years.”20   
The Mafia, whether a transnational organization or distinctively Sicilian, as 
described by Ianni, is undoubtedly different from La Cosa Nostra and provides a different 
perspective for analysis based on its social and political setting.  As Joseph Albini stated 
in 1988 when describing the Kefauver Hearings of 1951, “[w]hat no one realized, 
however, at the time of these hearings, was the Kefauver had planted the seed-‘the 
slippery label’-Mafia into the minds of the American public.  There is one characteristic 
that all ‘slippery labels’ have in common; they can be applied to different concepts, 
different organizations, different time periods, and a variety of other entities and be made 
to take on a semblance of truthfulness and authenticity.”21  Because of Albini’s “slippery 
label” definition, the differences demonstrated in Ianni’s study, and the FBI’s current 
website definition, this thesis will not use the term “Mafia” except when making use of 
governmental documents of the late 1960’s and 1970’s.22 
C. “LA COSA NOSTRA” 
The term “La Cosa Nostra,” which literally means “this thing of ours” as the FBI 
defines it on their website, is generally accepted as separate from the term “Mafia”.23  As 
with the term “Mafia,” the origins and true meaning of the term “La Cosa Nostra” are 
also debated, however, the generally accepted first public use of the term is attributed to 
Joseph Valachi and his testimony before the Senate McClellan Committee in 1963.  As 
stated on the FBI’s website,  
 
 
                                                 
20 “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Website [Website]; available from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm; Internet; 
accessed October 12, 2006. 
21 Joseph Albini, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation," 
Crime & Delinquency 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 345 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; 
accessed September 13, 2006. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Website [Website]; available from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm; Internet; 
accessed October 12, 2006. 
13 
In 1963, Joseph Valachi became the first La Cosa Nostra member to 
provide a detailed look at the inside of the organization. . . Valachi 
exposed the name, structure, power bases, codes, swearing-in ceremony, 
and members of this organization.24 
The literal translation of the term “La Cosa Nostra” also denotes a distinctly 
different connotation from that of “Mafia” and its accepted Italian/Sicilian origins.  Some 
academics, such as Ianni, claim that “this thing of ours” denotes an organization that is 
purposely different from that of the old Mafia in Italy and Sicily and is, “homegrown and 
is not the product of an imported, alien conspiracy.”25  Whether the term fits its literal 
translation or not is also debatable.  It does, however, demonstrate that this organization 
is distinctively different from that of the Mafia, and further shows the level of distinction 
needed for accurate analysis. 
Donald Cressey, as a part of the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized 
Crime and in his book Theft of the Nation, describes La Cosa Nostra as a fraternity of 
Italian-American organized crime families in the United States.26  The 1967 Task Force 
on Organized Crime also describes the FBI’s transition in its use of terms, “[t]o date, only 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to document fully the national scope of 
these groups [organized crime families], and FBI intelligence indicates that the 
organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La Cosa Nostra.”27  
Despite the term’s debatable origins and historical use in academic literature, 
Congressional hearings, or as law enforcement terminology, today La Cosa Nostra is 
generally accepted as an American group of loosely consolidated organized crime 
families of Italian or Sicilian origin.  This group, however, is not exclusively dominated 
by either ethnic Italians or Sicilians.  The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized 
Crime confirms this in the statement, “[t]he phrase [La Cosa Nostra] incorrectly implies 
                                                 
24 “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Website [Website]; available from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm; Internet; 
accessed October 12, 2006 
25Frank Hagan, "The Organized Crime Continuum: A further Specification of a New Conceptual 
Model," Criminal Justice Review 8, no. 2 (September, 1983): 52 [journal online]; available from 
www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 8, 2006.  
26 Donald Cressey, Theft of the Nation (New York:  Harper and Row, 1969), 10. 
27 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 6.  
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that all members of the conspiracy are Italian or Sicilian and, further, the term is 
unknown outside New York.”28  The findings of the 1967 Presidential Task Force also 
provide background for the study of organized crime families in New York under the 
term “La Cosa Nostra.” 
This study will use the term as it is generally accepted today to refer to a group of 
organized crime families in America and, as the FBI currently defines, it as, “a 
nationwide alliance of criminals, linked through both familial and conspiratorial ties that 
is [sic] dedicated to pursuing crime and protecting its members.”29  Using the term in this 
way allows for a comparative level of analysis to insurgent organizations distinctively 
different from the Mafia.  
D. “ORGANIZED CRIME” 
As with the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra,” the definition of “organized 
crime” is also debated among leading academics in the fields of criminology, sociology 
and social anthropology.  It has been used to describe a type of crime or criminal activity; 
a type of criminal organization; or an entire enterprise encompassing the Mafia, La Cosa 
Nostra, international criminal organizations such as the Russian mafia and Cuban mafia, 
and others such as the Klu Klux Klan and neighborhood gangs.  As Frank Hagan 
described in 1983, “[a]nalysis of criminology literature indicates that a large number of 
works including textbooks, fail to offer a clear definition.  Organized crime has often 
been described and discussed but rarely defined.”30  The 1967 Presidential Task Force on 
Organized Crime Report offers this definition, “[o]rganized crime is a society that seeks 
to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments.”31  Howard 
Abadinsky offers another definition in his book Organized Crime, “[o]rganized crime is a 
nonideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, 
                                                 
28 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 27. 
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www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 8, 2006. 
31 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1. 
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organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of 
securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.”32  Joseph Albini 
offers yet another definition, “(1) the use of force, intimidation, or threats of such, (2) the 
structuring of a group or organization whose purpose is that of providing illicit goods and 
services, and (3) providing legal and political forms of protection that assure its 
operation.”33 
For the purposes of analysis, this thesis will use a combination of both 
Abadinsky’s definition and Albini’s.  Organized crime will be referred to as an 
organization, having a formal structure with means of coercive force in order to ensure its 
operations and survival, which conducts legal and illegal activities.  By defining 
organized crime in this manner, this limits the argument that organized crime is merely a 
type of criminal behavior outside the socially accepted norms of a given society.  
E. FAMILY STRUCTURE 
In order to make a valid comparison between organized crime in America and 
insurgency organizations, it is necessary to describe the accepted terms within organized 
crime families and the traditional command hierarchy of these organizations. Joseph 
Albini describes the generally accepted methods to study organized crime in the 
following statement, “there are two schools or models that seek to describe and explain 
the structure and function of this form of criminal endeavor; one is commonly referred to 
as the governmental, law enforcement, President’s Task Force, evolutional-centralization, 
or traditional view while the other is generally conceptualized under such categories as a 
patron-client social system, informal structural-functional system, network system, or 
developmental association model.”34  Howard Abadinsky also describes the two leading 
models in the statement, “[t]he attributes of organized crime that we have examined can 
fit two contrasting organizational models:  the bureaucratic/corporate [hierarchical] and 
the patrimonial/patron-client network.”35  Both models provide a valid basis for the 
                                                 
32 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 5. 
33 Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York:  Meredith Corporation, 
1971), 126. 
34 Joseph Albini, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation," 
Crime & Delinquency 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 338 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; 
accessed September 13, 2006. 
35 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 8. 
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comparison of organized crime families and insurgent organizations.36  This thesis will 
focus on the hierarchical command nature of organized crime families to demonstrate 
their similarity to insurgent organizations  
1. Command Positions 
To understand the hierarchal command structure of organized crime and the 
authoritative relationship each member of the family has with others, some accepted 
positions within organized crime families need to be defined first.  This thesis will use 
these positions as a basis for comparison to insurgent organizations.  As with the terms 
“Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra,” the origins and exact nature of each position, and the total 
number of positions and jobs within organized crime families, is debatable among 
academics and law enforcement agencies.  However, the basis for each position and its 
place within the family are generally agreed upon as a result of Joseph Valechi’s 
testimony before the Senate McClellan Committee in 1963, the 1967 Presidential Task 
Force on Organized Crime’s Report, Donald Cressey’s book Theft of the Nation, the 
testimony of undercover FBI agent Joseph Pistone and his position within the Bonanno 
family, and historical wire tapping and eavesdropping evidence collected by the FBI. 
The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime’s report provides the terms 
that most academic and law enforcement studies use today.  The positions within 
organized crime families are:  the boss, the underboss, the counselor, the lieutenants or 
captains, and the soldiers or “made-men.” 
The 1967 report describes the position of the boss in the following manner, 
“[e]ach family is headed by one man, the ‘boss,’ whose primary functions are 
maintaining order and maximizing profits.”37  Howard Abadinsky also describes the boss 
in the statement, “[a]t the center of an Italian-American crime groups is the boss who in 
the past was usually a senior citizen-he needed many years to gain the respect of 
                                                 
36 For more information on the Patron-Client model see Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 3rd 
ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990)25, or Joseph Albini, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of 
Organized Crime: An Evaluation," Crime & Delinquency 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 338 [journal online]; 
available from www.csa.com, or Francis Ianni, A Family Business (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 
1972). 
37 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7. 
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members and the knowledge and connections need by the group.”38  This position is 
generally accepted as the head of a particular family and is also referred to as “capo,” 
although this term is also applied to lower levels of the organization as an abbreviated 
form of the word “coporegime.”39  The boss is the leader of the organization and controls 
the family similar to the leader of a legitimate business organization or military 
command. 
The 1967 report goes on to describe the positions of underboss and counselor.  
These positions have also been generally accepted among the academic and law 
enforcement communities as valid positions within organized crime families,  
Beneath each boss is an ‘underboss,’ the vice president or deputy director 
of the family.  He collects information for the boss; he relays messages to 
him and passes his instruction down to his own underlings.  In the absence 
of the boss, the underboss acts for him.  On the same level as the 
underboss, but operating in a staff capacity, is the consigliere, who is a 
counselor, or adviser.  Often an elder member of the family who has 
partially retired from a career in crime, he gives advice to family 
members, including the boss and underboss, and thereby enjoys 
considerable influence and power.40 
The 1967 report describes positions similar to a legal or professional business 
organization.  These are defined roles with a professional connotation and an accepted 
command hierarchy that its members adhere to.  The underboss is the second in 
command and ensures that the boss’s instructions are passed down within the 
organization.  This position is similar to an operations officer within a military 
organization or the vice president of a legitimate business.  Joseph Valachi is quoted in 
Donald Cressey’s book Theft of the Nation as stating, “[e]verybody today is 
professional.”41  The counselor as described by the 1967 report serves in an advisor 
capacity to that of the boss and is similar to an executive officer within a traditional  
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39 Ibid., 29. 
40 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7. 
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military hierarchy.  This is important to note because this thesis will use each term in that 
particular command context for the purpose of concise comparison to command positions 
within insurgent organizations. 
 Within the structure of the family, the next position level below the underboss and 
counselor is that of the lieutenant or captain or “caporegime.”42  The exact name of the 
position, whether lieutenant or captain, is debatable, however, the position within the 
command hierarchy is generally accepted despite which term is used and therefore each 
is interchangeable for the purposes of analysis.  The 1967 report describes the lieutenant 
or captain position in the following manner,  
. . . caporegime serve as chiefs of operating units.  The number of men 
supervised in each unit varies with the size and activities of particular 
families.  Often the caporegima[the position of caporegime] has one or 
two associates who work closely with him, carrying orders, information, 
and money to the men who belong to his unit.  From business standpoint, 
the caporegima is analogous to plant supervisor or sales manager.43 
As with the underboss and counselor positions, the 1967 report describes this position as 
being similar to that found in legitimate professional business organizations.  This 
position is the lowest managerial and command position within the organization.  It is 
comparable to the position of company commander within military organizations. 
 The lowest level within the family is that of the soldier, where grass roots level 
operations occur.  The 1967 report describes this position and its role in the statement, 
The lowest level “members” of a family are the soldati, the soldiers or 
“button” men who report to the caporegime.  A soldier may operate a 
particular illicit enterprise, e.g., a loan-sharking operation, a dice game, a 
lottery, a bookmaking operation, a smuggling operation, on a commission 
basis, or he may “own” the enterprise and pay a portion of its profit to the 
organization, in return for the right to operate.44 
Similar to soldiers in the military sense, these men operate at the lowest level of the 
organization and provide the muscle for the organization to operate.  This is where most 
                                                 
42 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7. 
43 Ibid., 8. 
44 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7. 
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of the direct illegal activities take place and where the organization has its greatest 
visibility among the surrounding population and to law enforcement. Soldiers and their 
crews are similar to platoon leaders and their platoons within a military organization 
2. Traditional Hierarchy 
The traditional hierarchy chart follows a traditional line and block chart where the 
leader is at the top of the organization and the lowest level workers are at the bottom.  
The organization’s executive officer is below the leader and his lower level leaders are 
below him.  The soldiers are depicted at the bottom of the chart with their associates and 
crews below them.  Soldiers are not responsible to every lieutenant as the chart might 
indicate; rather, they are individually grouped under particular lieutenants similar to 
platoons assigned under company commanders   
According to Joseph Albini, the traditional hierarchy is given different names:  
“the governmental, law enforcement, President’s Task Force, evolutional-centralization, 
or traditional view.”45  Albini also describes this as “the Cressey model” due to the 
contributions of Donald Cressey to the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime 
and his subsequent book Theft of the Nation.46  Howard Abadinsky also provides another 
name for this structure:  “Bureaucratic/Corporate Model.”47  He continues and describes 
the model in the following manner,  
The corporation, the police, and the military are examples of 
bureaucracies, that mode of organization essential for efficiently carrying 
out large-scale tasks.  All bureaucracies share a number of attributes; they 
are rationally organized with a complicated hierarchy, an extensive 
division of labor, positions assigned on the basis of skill, responsibilities 
carried out in an impersonal manner, extensive rules and regulations, 
communication from the top of the hierarchy to persons on the bottom, 
usually in written (memo) form48 
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46 Ibid. 
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48 Ibid. 
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Despite the numerous different names given to this type of structure, this thesis will refer 
to it as the traditional command hierarchy in order to avoid confusion and provide a clear 
level of analysis.   
The hierarchy as it is laid out in Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship of each 
position within the organized crime family hierarchy and is taken directly from the 1967 
Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime’s Report.49  The position of the boss or 
leader is located at the top of the hierarchy, with the counselor in a subordinate role 
outside the direct chain of command.  The positions of the underboss and the lieutenants 
in the chart show their positions of authority and responsibility within the organization 
based on a clear delineation of command and responsibility from the top.  The position of 
the soldiers at the bottom shows their role at the lowest levels of the organization and 
their jobs and responsibilities.  The bottom of the chart also shows the types of legal and 
illegal activities run by the organization and the lowest level of responsibility or 
accountability for the activities.   
The chart does not show the grouping of soldiers under each lieutenant as 
described by the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime Report, where there 
may be a number of soldiers and their crews directly responsible to a particular 
lieutenant.  The chart also fails to show the possible division of labor among criminal 
activities between each lieutenant and his soldiers.  In addition, the possible social and 
genealogical relationships that might exist within a particular organized crime family are 
not shown.  For example, men within higher positions in the hierarchy could be fathers or 
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Figure 1.   Organized Crime Family Hierarchy Chart.  (From:  1967 Task Force) 
 
3. Patron-Client Model 
The second type of generally accepted method of study of organized crime 
families is the patron-client model described in Figure 2.  As with the hierarchical chart, 
this model demonstrates the hierarchy of organized crime families.  Abadnisky describes 
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the relationships within this model as patron-client, the patron being closer to the center 
of the model and the client being further out.50  He further demonstrates this relationship 
in the statement, “[t]he patron. . . acts as a power broker between the client and the wider 
society, both legitimate and illegitimate.”51  This model provides similar structural 
relationships to the hierarchical chart.   
Similar to the hierarchical model, the boss is the center of the organization with 
his underboss and counselor located directly with him.  The lieutenants and their soldiers 
fan out from the center to show the different levels within the organization.  Despite 
differences in approach, the positions within organized crime families as stated earlier in 
this chapter remain the same, such as the boss, underboss, counselor, lieutenants and 
soldiers.  For the purposes of analysis, this study will use the hierarchal chart to show the 














                                                 








































Patron-Client Network of Italian-American Organized Crime
(a) At the center of each organized crime unit (famiglia: Family) is the boss (capo)
He is assisted by an underboss (sottocapo) and a counselor (consigliere).
(b) Surrounding the boss are his clients, the captains (capiregime).
(c) Orbiting around each captain are his clients, the lowest-ranking members who
have been formally initiated into the Family (soldati; “made-guys”).
(d) The members act as patrons to nonmember clients.
(e) Each unit is tied to other Families throughout the country by the capo, whose
sovereignty is recognized by the other bosses.
 
Figure 2.   Patron-Client Model.  (From:  Abadinsky) 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The history, context and usage of the different terms such as the “Mafia,” “La 
Cosa Nostra,” “organized crime,” and the different types of relationships within the 
family hierarchy are grounds for further study within the subject of criminology, 
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sociology and social anthropology.  By understanding the manner in which organized 
crime is studied, one can make the correct linkages between organized crime families and 
insurgent organizations and increase the possibility of using law enforcement anti-
organized crime techniques correctly and in the right context given the military’s 




III. NEW YORK CRIME FAMILIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are five generally accepted La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York.  
They are the Bonanno Family, the Luchese Family, the Colombo Family, the Genovese 
Family, and the Gambino family.  Diarmuid Jeffreys, in his book The Bureau:  Inside the 
Modern FBI, confirms this in the statement, “Gambino, Lucchese[sic], Colombo, 
Genovese, Bonanno- these names have become synonymous with Cosa Nostra activity in 
New York, where the five families have dominated organized crime for as long as most 
people can remember.”52  This study focuses on these families so as to be able to draw 
from the vast amount of academic, governmental, and law enforcement data on them.  
Both the 1983 Committee on the Judiciary hearing and the 1988 Committee on 
Governmental Affairs hearings have an enormous amount of data on the disposition of 
each family, some of their criminal undertakings, and their locations within the New 
York and New Jersey area.  This study will not focus on their criminality, but use this 
data to show the command relationships.   
The command hierarchy chart of each family focuses on the authoritative 
structure of these organizations both in 1983 and 1987 to demonstrate the evolving nature 
of these families and the membership movement within these organizations.  Members 
change positions based on death, retirement and incarceration.  However, not all 
incarcerations affect the structure, as some bosses continue to run their organizations 
while in jail.   
Within each chart, the membership listed represents the data presented before 
Congress in 1983 and 1988 and may not totally encompass the entire organization.  It 
focuses on the top level positions and those members that met the criteria for public 
notification by law enforcement agencies at the time.53  All of the family members listed 
in each of the following figures had open case files or criminal records recorded by the 
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53 Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Organized Crime:  25 Years After 
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FBI, the state of New York, or both at the time of each of the Congressional hearing.  The 
data for these names was collected by the FBI, New York State Police, and local law 
enforcement agencies in order to provide an accurate picture of these organizations at the 
time.54  Although law enforcement agencies had open files on each of the members of 
these families, their names do not denote criminal guilt and for the purposes of this study 
are used in order to demonstrate the command positions that each held within the 
hierarchy of these organizations, such as the boss, underboss, counselor, or lieutenant.  
The study of the criminality of each family and the genealogical relationships that exist 
within some of the families is an area for possible further study.   
The data shown for each family was collected by the New York City Police 
Department for the 1983 Committee on the Judiciary.55  The data for the 1987 families 
was collected for the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs.56 
B. BONANNO FAMILY 
Figures 3 and 4 show the command relationships within the Bonanno Family in 
1983 and 1987.  The charts also show the evolving nature of the family between the four 
years and the differences that could possibly exist within a short period.  Both Figure 3 
and Figure 4 show Philip Rastelli as boss of the Bonanno Family, with Salvatore 
Farruggia as acting boss in Figure 3.  The reasons for having an acting boss are not clear; 
however, the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs data shows that Philip Rastelli 
was in failing health, thereby offering a possible explanation.57  Neither the 1983 nor 
1988 report clearly state the reasons for this position, nor does the 1967 Presidential Task 
Force Report on Organized Crime.  The title does, however, indicate that this position is 
temporary in nature.  Figure 4 supports this conclusion because the position is not listed 
and the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs data shows Philip Rastelli as head of 
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this family and running the organization despite his imprisonment.58  The 1988 data also 
supports the conclusion that others within the family act on the behalf of members that 
are imprisoned and in their capacity within the organization.59   
Jospeh Massino in Figure 4 moves from lieutenant to underboss demonstrating 
that a hierarchical move or promotion within this organization is similar to a promotion 
within a legitimate business structure or military organization.  The reason for the 
decrease in the number of lieutenants from Figure 3 to Figure 4 is also not clear.  The 
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Figure 3.   1983 Bonanno Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1983 Committee) 
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Figure 4.   1987 Bonanno Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1988 Committee) 
 
Joseph Pistone’s testimony on the Bonanno Family provides insight regarding the 
lower level of this organization,  
There is a surprising similarity which marks the innerworkings [sic] of the 
Mafia and contemporary terrorist organizations.  The families are broken 
down into small, separate cells, commonly called crews.  You work with 
that crew and rarely ever deal with any other crews.  In all likelihood, a 
member of one crew may not even know who are the members of another 
crew in his own family.60 
The lower level of this organization gives the family structure a level of security and 
secrecy similar to other cell type organizations. 
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C. LUCCHESE FAMILY 
Figures 5 and 6 show the command relationships of members of the Luchese 
Family in 1983 and 1987 respectively. Figure 5 shows Antonio Corallo as the boss of the 
Luchese Family in 1983 and Figure 6 shows Vittorio Amuso in this position in 1987.  
The only upward movement within this hierarchy during this time was Anthony Casso, 
who moved from lieutenant in Figure 5 to counselor in Figure 6.  This promotion could 
be due to a number of factors such as the incarceration, death, or retirement of 
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Figure 6.   1987 Luchese Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1988 Committee) 
 
The complete change within the command hierarchy between 1983 and 1987 also 
supports the conclusion that targeting the head of the family does not necessarily result in 
the destruction of the entire organization.  The organization merely replaces the 
individual with another who assumes command in that position or someone acts on his 
behalf and in his capacity. 
D. COLOMBO FAMILY 
Figures 7 and 8 show the command relationships of the Colombo Family in 1983 
and 1987 respectively.  The movement of Alphonse Persico from 1983 to 1987 shows the 
upward mobility within the command hierarchy and the possibility for promotion within 
the organization.  The charts also demonstrate the resilient nature of this family and the 
general lack of turnover despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies.   
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Figures 7 and 8 show Carmine Persico, Jr. as the head of the Colombo Family 
with Thomas Anthony Dibella as the counselor.  Figure 7 shows Alphonse Persico 
moving from the position of lieutenant in 1983 to that of counselor in 1987.  As with the 
Bonanno Family boss, Philip Rastelli, the Colombo Family boss Carmine Persico, Jr. led 
the family in 1983 and 1987 while in prison, further demonstrating that incarcerating the 
head of the family does not necessarily hinder its operations or destroy its organization.61  
As with other families, the lieutenants within the family changed between 1983 and 1987.  
Within this family, however, four of the thirteen lieutenants remained the same between 
the four years.  The 1983 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on 
the Judiciary states that, “[a]lthough this Network’s upper echelon has been hard hit by 
arrests, convictions and returns to prison for parole violations, their activities have 
continued unaffected.”62  The lieutenant data listed in both Figure 6 and 7 also supports 













                                                 
61 Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Organized Crime:  25 Years After 
Valachi, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 919. 
62 Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Organized Crime in America: Part 2, Ninety-










































Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers
*soldiers are aligned with individual lieutenants and not collectively
 





















































Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers Soldiers







Figure 8.   1987 Colombo Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1988 Committee) 
 
E. GENOVESE FAMILY 
Figures 9 and 10 show the command structure of the Genovese Family as it 
existed in 1983 and 1987 respectively.  Figure 9 shows Philip Lombardo as the head of 
the Genovese Family with Anthony Solerno as the underboss and Gerardo Catena as the 
counselor.  In Figure 10, the 1987 New York City Police Department Report to the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs shows the promotion of Vincent Gigante from 
lieutenant in 1983 to head of the family in 1987 based on the arrest and imprisonment of 
Anthony Salerno.63  As with other families, the lieutenants within the family changed 
between 1983 and 1987.  The 1983 New York City Police Department Report to the 
Committee on the Judiciary confirms this in the statement, “Genovese members have a 
reputation for aggressively expanding operations through the use of ‘legitimate’ frontmen 
[sic] who have successfully assumed control of many business ventures connected with 
                                                 
63 Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Organized Crime:  25 Years After 
Valachi, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 934. 
34 
the local entertainment industry.”64  The use of legitimate business at the bottom of the 
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Figure 10.   1987 Genovese Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1988 Committee) 
 
F. GAMBINO FAMILY 
The Gambino Family, as stated in the 1983 New York City Report to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, “is considered to be the largest, most influential criminal 
organization in New York City.”65  Figures 11 and 12 show the command structure as it 
existed in 1983 and 1987 respectively.  Figure 11 shows Paul Castellano as boss of the 
Gambino Family with Aniello Dellacroce as underboss and Joseph Gallo as counselor.  
Figure 12 shows the promotions of John Gotti from lieutenant to boss and Joseph 
Armone from lieutenant to underboss.  In addition, Salvatore Gravano became counselor.  
According to the 1987 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Gotti and Armone were promoted after Paul Castellano and Frank 
DeCicco were killed while serving in the positions of boss and underboss, respectively, in 
                                                 
65 Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Organized Crime in America: Part 2, Ninety-
eighth Congress, First sess., 1983, 195. 
36 
1985.66  The promotions suggest that the positions within the organization are more 
important than the individuals who fill them.  Despite the death of the boss, the family 
replaced the leader from within its ranks and continued to operate.  As with other 
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Figure 12.   1987 Gambino Family Hierarchy.  (After:  April 1988 Committee) 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The hierarchical charts of each of the five New York La Cosa Nostra families 
demonstrate the importance of each position within the family structure.  Despite the 
changeover within the ranks of the lieutenants, which most families did in significant 
numbers from 1983 to 1987, the positions of boss, underboss and counselor were always 
maintained by either a new member from within the existing ranks or the former boss 
with a stand-in member.  This data demonstrates that the command positions within the 
organization are more important than the individuals who maintain them.  This is not to 
discount individual leadership or charisma and the importance that each plays in 
commanding the organization.  Rather, it points out that by eliminating one member, 
even if the head of the organization, the organization will continue to exist by filling that 
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member’s position with another member.  This conclusion is essential to comparing this 
organization to insurgencies because of the importance the command structure plays.  
The capturing or killing of the head of the organization may not eliminate it; rather the 
organization will reorganize itself in order to fill the command position.  This data 
provides evidence for the strategy of targeting the organization as a whole, rather than 
individual members either at the top of the organization or at the bottom.   
The involvement outside the organization and the separation of its exterior 
members from the center supports the organization’s survival.  The hierarchal command 
structure and business-like nature of the organization supports the upward mobility that 




IV. ALN IN THE CASBAH FROM 1956 TO 1957 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was an insurgent organization that 
fought against France for Algerian independence from 1954 to 1962.  As an insurgent 
organization, the FLN was extremely organized and complex at both the national and 
local levels.  The FLN used anti-colonial sentiment as the basis for gaining popular 
support both within the urban and rural areas of the country.  The organization was 
similar to most insurgent groups in that it started with a select educated few at the top of 
the organization and then evolved and recruited membership down to the lowest levels of 
Algerian society.  Unlike most insurgent groups, however, the FLN lacked a clearly 
stated and defined ideology as the basis for revolt and post revolution government.  
Martha Hutchinson describes the FLN’s ideology in the statement, “[t]he FLN did not 
possess a highly structured or comprehensive ideology; the revolution was simply guided 
by nationalism.”67  Despite the lack of a clear ideology for post-independence 
government, the organization was highly organized with a well defined command 
structure.  The FLN was broken down geographically into six wilayas across the country 
in which it conducted operations.68 
Within the city of Algiers, the FLN was broken down into three autonomous 
zones, Algiers One, Two, and Three.69  The FLN acted as the political arm of the 
insurgent organization, and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) acted as the 
military or operational branch of the organization.  Similar to the Soviet model where 
each level of the military was accountable to a political officer, the ALN was directly 
accountable to the FLN at each national level wilaya.  Below the national level divisions, 
the ALN alignment with the FLN was less clear, however, the political organization still 
controlled the military operations of the insurgency as illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Within the city of Algiers, the breakdown of the ALN below the city level was 
also unclear.  General Jacques Massu, commander of the 10th French Paratrooper 
Division in Algiers, acknowledges this in his book La Vraie Bataille D’Alger (The True 
Battle of Algiers), in which he states, “Nos découvertes concernant l’ALN dans Alger 
sont moins nettes qu’en ce qui concerne l’organisation politico-administrative. [Our 
discoveries concerning the ALN in Algiers were less clear than those concerning the 
political-administrative organization].”70  Despite the breakdown of the FLN below the 
city level, the ALN operated almost exclusively out of the Muslim quarter of the city 
known as the Casbah.  The Casbah provided the organization a headquarters and safe 
haven within the Arab population of the city and the ALN’s organization here is the focus 
of this study. 
The Battle of Algiers in 1957 became the focal point of the FLN operations in 
Algeria during its struggle for independence and is most closely associated with the 
FLN’s overall operations within Algeria during this time.  The exact beginning of the 
battle and who started the fighting is unclear; however, most academics agree it began 
with the killing of nine pied noir (non-Arabs) in June 1957 by Yacef Saadi’s ALN and 
the subsequent retaliatory bombing of the Casbah by pied noir extremists.71  The ALN 
retaliated by bombing three targets within the European sectors of Algiers, escalating the 
revolutionary conflict within the city.72  Widespread violence between Arabs and the pied 
noir resulted.73  The breakdown of law and order within the city became known as the 
Battle of Algiers and on January 7, 1957, General Jacques Massu and his 10th 
Paratrooper Division were called in to stop the violence and regain order.74   
During the Battle of Algiers as well as at other times in the revolt, the ALN used 
terrorism as a tactic in its military operations against the French.  The brutality of their 
attacks in Algiers and the ensuing brutal retaliation by both the French Paratroopers and 
the pied noir caused the organization to gradually lose support both within the upper 
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leadership of the FLN and the population of the Casbah.  The ALN in Algiers was 
eventually defeated in 1957 when most of the upper leadership was either killed or 
captured by French Paratroopers.  The brutality of the French interrogation methods and 
the political fallout from their use eventually led to the loss of international support for 
the French.  Algeria was granted independence under the FLN in 1962.75   
This study will not focus on the exact details of the Battle of Algiers, the use of 
terrorism by the ALN, or the use of torture by the French to break down the ALN 
hierarchy.  The brief background of the Battle of Algiers has been given to demonstrate 
the ALN’s military presence within this conflict and its role as the military arm of the 
FLN.  The national level structure of the FLN, its complexity, and its precise hierarchical 
breakdown is another area for possible further study.  This thesis will focus on the 
internal command structure of the ALN in Algiers and the command relationship of its 
members as it existed in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957. 
B. ALN COMMAND STRUCTURE 
Figure 13 outlines the ALN command structure in 1956 and 1957.  The data for 
Figure 13 is taken from Roger Trinquier’s book Modern Warfare:  A French View of 
Counterinsurgency.  Trinquier was a Lieutenant Colonel on General Jacques Massu’s 
staff during the Battle of Algiers.  He successfully instituted a program of clandestine 
informants inside the Casbah which provided vital information of the exact command 
structure of the ALN.  Trinquier describes the ALN’s command structure in the following 
manner, “[t]he district commander and his deputy were at the head of three armed groups, 
each headed by a leader and deputy and composed of three cells of three men each.”76  
Jacques Massu confirms the declination of the organization into sets of three in the 
statement, “Il semble que le système soit ternaire.[It appears the system was ternary.]”77  
Trinquier further describes the structure of the ALN in the statement, “[a] clandestine 
organization of such size and complexity requires for its creation both time and a precise 
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technique.”78  Trinquier’s description of the ALN command structure provides evidence 




















Figure 13.   ALN Command Structure in Algiers.  (After:  Trinquier) 
 
The ALN command hierarchy closely resembled that of a traditional military 
command structure with a commander at the head of the organization and an executive 
officer below him.  The commander of the organization provided guidance and mission 
instructions to his subordinates within his command structure based upon his mission, 
similar to a traditional military commander.  The executive officer served as his chief of 
staff and second in command of the organization.  Each lower level within the command 
also had a commander and an executive officer with cells of three being the lowest level 
of operation within the structure.  This structure resembled a traditional military battalion 
level structure with a battalion commander at the top of the organization, company 
commanders below him, and platoon leaders below the company commanders.   
The cells of this organization resembled the platoons of traditional military 
hierarchies and represented the lowest level of the organization.  This is the primary level                                                  
78 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare:  A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (New 
York:  Frederick Praeger, 1964), 13-14. 
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of military operations conducted against the French Paratroopers and pied noir during the 
Battle of Algiers.  Due to their network structure, the cells provided a measure of 
operational security to the hierarchy of the organization.  Cell members lacked 
knowledge of the organization above their immediate superiors and about other cells at 
the same level within the organization.   
Although not shown in Figure 13, the ALN also had a “shock group” located at 
the top of the organization which operated separately from the lower levels and reported 
directly to the commander.79  This group served as a special staff to the commander and 
consisted of bomb making, internal police, “shock group,” and logistics.80  This group 
conducted operations under the direct orders and supervision of the commander and as 
Trinquier describes, was “[c]arefully kept apart from other elements of the 
organization.”81  The precise nature of the command hierarchy and delineation into 
groups of three shows the highly organized and structured nature of the ALN command 
hierarchy.   
The command structure of the ALN allowed for effective operations against the 
French during the Battle of Algiers.  However, the detail of the organization and the clear 
breakdown into groups of three allowed for effective intelligence collection against the 
organization despite the cell structure at the lowest level.  Once the lowest level of the 
ALN was penetrated, the ability to know which positions were still operating was 
possible.  It was also possible to confirm the positions of individual members within the 
organization.  Professor Douglas Porch describes a consequence of the ALN’s detailed 
organizational structure in the statement, “[o]ne of the most flagrant security breaches 
was created by the FLN’s tendency, curiously bureaucratic for a clandestine organization, 
to generate tremendous amounts of paper- reports on meetings or of operations in which 
the names of those who had performed especially well were cited for special 
recognition.”82  The precision and detailed command hierarchy of the ALN allowed for 
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effective operations against the French, however, it was the same precision and 
organization that eventually led to the ALN’s destruction. 
Figure 14 shows the actual command structure of the ALN in the Casbah from 
1956 to 1957 as described by Jacques Massu in his book La Vraie Bataille d’Alger.83  
Figure 14 shows Ben M’hidi at the top of the organization.  Ben M’hidi was the FLN 
political leader of the city of Algiers and gave instructions to his ALN commander Yacef 
Saadi for military operations.84  The placement of Ben M’hidi at the top of the 
organization demonstrates the importance of the political arm of the FLN in relation to its 
military operations.  The position of the military commander below the political leader 
also demonstrates the use of military operations to support the FLN’s political goals 
during the conflict and the importance of political operations over military ones.  Ben 
M’hidi was eventually captured by the French Paratroopers on February 25, 1957 and 
died while in captivity on March 6, 1957 under suspicious circumstances.85  Ben 
M’hidi’s death, however, did not break down the command structure of the organization.  
Yacef Saadi assumed complete command of ALN operations in Algiers and continued its 
operations until his own capture later that same year.  Yacef Saadi’s complete control of 
the organization after Ben M’hidi’s death demonstrates the vertical movement typical of 
hierarchical organizations with a defined command structure. 
Alistair Horne describes the detail and precision of Yacef Saadi’s military 
organization in his book A Savage War of Peace:  Algeria 1954-1962 as, “a meticulously 
organized hierarchy.”86  The hierarchical command structure of the organization shown 
in Figure 14 shows the clear lines of authority from the top of the organization to the 
operating cells at the bottom.  Figure 14 also shows Amara Ali, known as Ali la Pointe, in 
the deputy position to that of Yacef Saadi.  Alistair Horne described him as, “Yacef’s 
most loyal and valuable lieutenant,” however his exact position and title within the 
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organization is unclear.87  His description as being Yacef Saadi’s lieutenant denotes a 
lower position within the command hierarchy, but his importance within the organization 
and his loyalty to Yacef Saadi placed him above that of the armed group commanders.  
Jacque Massu’s book also places Amara Ali at the top of the organization and in a deputy 
role to that of Yacef Saadi.88   
Amara Ali was also described as being head of Yacef Saadi’s “shock group.”89  
Despite the ambiguity as to his exact command position within the hierarchy, his position 
at the upper level of the organization is clear and is shown in Figure 14 below that of 
Yacef Saadi, but above the armed group leaders.  His importance at the top of the 
organization is also evident with the destruction of the ALN and the accepted end of the 
Battle of Algiers upon his death.  Alistair Horne confirms this in the statement, “[w]ith 
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Figure 14.   Casbah ALN Command Structure.  (After:  Massu) 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
The precision and highly organized command structure of the ALN allowed it to 
effectively and efficiently operate during the Battle of Algiers, however, these same 
characteristics also allowed the French to effectively break down the organization’s 
hierarchy and capture or kill most of its members including the capture of Yacef Saadi; 
and the killing of Amari Ali.  The demise of the ALN following the capture and death of 
the ALN’s upper leadership could lead to the conclusion that the individuals within this 
command hierarchy were more important than the command positions they occupied.  
This, however, is not entirely true.  The geographically isolated position of the Casbah 
and the dwindling support of the upper leadership of the FLN of Saadi’s terrorism 
methods put Saadi’s capture and Ali’s death into a different context.  The ALN was 
unable to reorganize because the French Paratroopers isolated the Casbah from the rest of 
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the city and the rest of the country.  Movement in and out of the Casbah was controlled 
by military checkpoints and the Paratroopers routinely conducted mass roundups of the 
population in order to conduct interrogations.  The FLN was unable to reorganize the 
command structure of the ALN due to the almost complete control of the Casbah by the 
French.  From this perspective, the French targeted the organization as a whole and 
denied it the ability to reorganize. 
The French specifically targeted the organization as a whole and by effectively 
cordoning off the entire Casbah, they were able to break down the organization from the 
lowest level up.  Trinquier demonstrates the French strategy of targeting the entire 
organization in the statement, “[t]o win, we have to destroy this entire organization.”91  
Alistair Horne also describes the French Paratrooper’s actions against the organization as 
a whole in the statement,  
threads of intelligence gathered in the course of rounding up the bombers 
were leading back closer and closer to the really big fish.  To Godard, ‘the 
man who places the bomb is but an arm that tomorrow will be replaced by 
another arm.’ It was essential to get at the brain behind the arm.92 
Horne’s description of the Paratrooper’s actions provides evidence for the strategy of 
attacking the entire command structure of the organization as well as the ALN’s capacity 
to regenerate itself at lower levels.   
During the Battle of Algiers, the ALN continually tried to rebuild its organization 
as members were either captured or killed; however, the organization’s ability to 
completely reorganize at the upper levels was extremely limited due to its isolation.  
Horne provides evidence for the ALN’s lower level reorganization in the statement, 
“Yacef being Yacef, he refused to accept defeat, and in a remarkable fashion began to 
pick up the pieces, reconstitute his organization and prepare for a fresh offensive.”93  
However, despite Yacef’s efforts to rebuild his organization, the geographical isolation 
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and loss of support from the upper leadership of the FLN eventually allowed the French 
to completely destroy Saadi’s military structure within the city of Algiers. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The detailed organization and hierarchical nature of the ALN is evident in both 
the command structure of the ALN and its organization within the Casbah.  The 
movement of Yacef Saadi to head of the organization upon Ben M’hidi’s death shows the 
upward movement within this command hierarchy as well as the organization’s initial 
ability to continue operations.  The geographical isolation of the ALN in the Casbah and 
the destruction of the organization from the ground up prevented the ALN from 
completely reorganizing and continuing operations.   
Despite the French success, Yacef Saadi did try and rebuild the ALN hierarchy. 
However, his own capture and his isolation from the rest of the FLN prevented the 
organization from completely rebuilding.  The success of the French during the Battle of 
Algiers demonstrates the importance of targeting the entire organization and not just 
members at either the top or bottom of the hierarchy.   
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are fundamental differences between organized crime families and 
insurgent organizations that need to be addressed in order to analyze the validity of the 
analogy between the groups and place it in the correct contexts.  By acknowledging the 
clear differences between organized crime and insurgent groups, one can then accurately 
compare their similarities and make the correct deductions.  
Organized crime families are criminal organizations that are largely parasitic 
within society, focusing on illicit enterprises in order to make a profit.  They lack a stated 
political ideology outside the enterprise of making money for the organization.  They 
work outside the laws of society and use the gaps in governmental control to make 
money for their members.  They do not seek to overthrow the government, but merely 
use members of the existing structure to protect their illegal activities.  They would rather 
bribe and control governmental officials than implement a government structure of their 
own.  By bribing officials, organized crime nullifies the existing system in order to 
conduct business.  Hugh Barlow confirms this in the statement, “[b]ecause it pays off in 
security, organized crime will continue to pursue the nullification of government.”94  
Organized crime families depend on the laws of society in order to make money from 
their illicit enterprises.  They do not seek to replace the existing structure with a 
government of their own.  The laws of society also provide the basis for their illegal 
activities.  If there were no laws against their activities, they would not be able to make a 
profit from conducting them. They need an existing governmental structure to conduct 
their operations.   
Organized crime does not seek membership for the purposes of popular support 
within a given population.  It recruits mainly for expansion of its own enterprises.  A 
member of society can not simply want to join the organization and sign up.  Membership 
is sought by the organization itself for its own advantages and purposes, such as 
protection or the advancement of profit.   
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Insurgent organizations, however, usually have a clearly defined ideology for the 
purposes of replacing the existing governmental structure.  They seek to replace the 
existing structure of government and its laws with a government and laws of their own.  
Andrew Krepinevich expresses this in the statement, “[a]n insurgency is a protracted 
struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to obtain specific intermediate 
objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”95  Insurgent groups 
seek membership as a basis of popular support for their cause and use the population in 
order to overthrow the existing governmental structure.  Krepinevich writes, “[t]he 
bottom line for a successful guerilla warfare operation, then, is a primary support system 
anchored on the population.”96  The population becomes the basis of insurgent operations 
rather than using the population for the organization’s profit.  Insurgent organizations 
also draw upon a societal need or perceived societal need rather than the goal of making a 
monetary profit from the existing gaps in the governmental structure.  Insurgent groups 
do not seek to work within the laws of a given society; rather, they seek to replace them. 
With some of the basic conceptual differences between organized crime and 
insurgencies identified, there are some similarities between both organizations that merit 
comparative analysis.  The organizational command structure of the La Cosa Nostra 
crime families of New York and the command structure of the ALN in the Casbah during 
the Battle of Algiers are very similar and provide a basis for command structure analysis.  
Both the individual crime families in New York and the ALN in the Casbah have a 
clearly defined hierarchy and command structure.  The command positions within both 
organizations are also very similar and play a similar role within each organization.   
The secrecy of both organizations is also very similar as well as their mechanisms 
for maintaining it.  Structurally both groups organize at the lowest level in order to 
protect their upper level leadership.  The existence of both organizations is also highly 
dependent on secrecy within the population.  By analyzing the similarities between  
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organized crime and insurgent groups and in the correct context, one is in a better 
position to apply correct law enforcement strategies effectively to counterinsurgency 
operations and doctrine. 
B. VALID ANALOGIES IN COMMAND STRUCTURE 
The command structure of individual crime families in New York and the ALN in 
the Casbah are very similar and provide a valid basis for the command structure analogy.  
Each group organized itself in a clear hierarchy with a defined chain of command from 
the top down.  Figures 1 and 12 show the similarity between these organizations based on 
their structure alone.  The individual crime family charts listed in Chapter III as well as 
the ALN command chart listed in Chapter IV provide supporting evidence for this 
conclusion 
The position of the boss as the leader of an organized crime family is similar to 
the district commander position within the ALN.  The 1967 Task Force on Organized 
Crime Report states that, “[e]ach family is headed by one man, the “boss,” whose 
primary functions are maintaining order and maximizing profits.”97  Within the context 
of organized crime families, the boss provided guidance to the family and issued 
commands based on the family’s primary mission of making money.  The district 
commander of the ALN maintained a similar role within its command structure.  He 
provided instructions to his subordinates based on the ALN’s mission of providing 
military operations in support of the FLN’s political objectives.  Within their contexts 
both positions are similar to that of a military commander, where in the leader guides the 
direction of the organization according to its mission- for organized crime, making 
money, and for the ALN, supporting the political goals of the insurgency.  Yacef Saadi’s 
position as commander of the ALN is analogous to John Gotti’s position as boss of the 
Gambino Family or Philip Rastilli’s as boss of the Bonanno Family.  Saadi, Gotti, and 
Rastilli clearly led their organizations and their position at the top of the command 
hierarchy confirms this conclusion. 
The underboss in an organized crime family is similar to the deputy commander 
of the ALN in both his command relationship to the leader and his role within the 
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organization.  The underboss is described as, “the vice president or deputy director of the 
family.  He collects information for the boss; he relays messages to him and passes his 
instruction down to his own underlings.  In the absence of the boss, the underboss acts for 
him.”98  The deputy commander of the ALN maintained a similar role within that 
command hierarchy.  He acted as the executive officer of the organization and second in 
command to the district commander.   
The position of lieutenant within organized crime families is similar to the armed 
group leader of the ALN.  The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime described the role 
of lieutenants in the following statement, 
. . . caporegime serve as chiefs of operating units.  The number of men 
supervised in each unit varies with the size and activities of particular 
families.  Often the caporegima [the position of caporegime] has one or 
two associates who work closely with him, carrying orders, information, 
and money to the men who belong to his unit.99 
The armed group leaders of the ALN maintained a similar role within their organization.  
Trinquier described the armed group leaders in the following manner, “three armed 
groups, each headed by a leader and deputy and composed of three cells of three men 
each.”100  The position of the armed group leader and his deputy is similar to that of the 
lieutenants and their associates both in terms of their command roles and their positions 
as leaders of the operating level of their organizations.  This is similar to the company 
commander over his platoon leaders and platoons within a traditional military 
organization. 
The position of soldiers and their cell structure as described in Chapter III is 
similar to the operating cells at the bottom of the ALN command structure.  This level of 
the organization is similar to the platoons within a military structure.  The organized 
crime families and ALN both used cell networks at the lowest level to provide security to 
the upper echelons of the command structure and conduct day to day operations.  The 
                                                 
98 United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7. 
99 Ibid., 8. 
100 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare:  A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (New 
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lowest level of both structures also conducted the majority of each organization’s 
operations and was most visible to authorities.   
The command structure within both the organized crime families of New York 
and the ALN is clearly visible in the detailed hierarchy of both organizations.  The 
command structures of both organizations are analogous; however, they still need to be 
viewed within their correct contexts.  The importance of the commander within the 
organizations could lead to the conclusion that targeting the upper leadership would break 
down both organizations.  The data for organized crime families clearly shows this not to 
be the case.  The death and capture of the ALN in Algiers could also provide evidence for 
targeting the leadership of the organization.  The context of the ALN, however, is slightly 
different from that of the organized crime families of New York and demonstrates the 
importance of detailed analysis before making complete assumptions.  The ALN was 
unable to reorganize and rebuild due to the specific and unique tactical situation within 
Algiers and not necessarily due to the importance of the individual leaders.  The ALN 
clearly tried to reorganize its lower leadership under Yacef Saadi, however, the tactical 
situation limited its efforts and prevented the organization from completely rebuilding.   
Based on the data collected on both the organized crime families in New York 
and the ALN, each organization has a clear commander, with a deputy who acts either on 
his behalf or relays instructions down to subordinate members.  The commander guides 
the organization according to its mission and leads the command hierarchy of the 
organization.  The clear delineation at the top of the organization also allows for unity of 
command within the organization, which is often critical to mission success.  The middle 
leadership within each organization was also in charge of the bottom of the organization, 
where day to day operations occur.  The bottom of both organizations also provide a level 
of security and secrecy between the lowest level and the upper command.   
Within the context of either the crime families of New York or the ALN, the 
strategy of targeting the organization as a whole can be effective.  Both Trinquier and 
Horne acknowledged that the French targeted the ALN as a whole instead of individual 
members, causing the eventual collapse of the ALN in the Casbah.  As Trinquier stated, 
“[v]ictory therefore can be attained only through the complete destruction of the entire 
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organization.”101  The FBI website and its stated strategy as outlined in Chapter I provide 
evidence for the law enforcement strategy of targeting organized crime families as 
wholes instead of going after individual members.  The similarity of command structure 
between organized crime families and insurgencies provides a valid analogy for this 
strategy and is an important lesson in developing counterinsurgency strategy for future 
operations.  
The similarities in command structure also provide a basis for collecting 
intelligence on insurgent organizations.  If a target of collection is at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, he may not know who is above his immediate superior.  Asking him the exact 
structure of the organization will likely provide little to no actionable intelligence.  
However, by knowing that there is a defined command structure, it may be possible to 
learn about the structure of the insurgency through well-placed intelligence assets.   
C. VALID ANALOGIES IN SECRECY 
Both organized crime families and insurgent organizations rely on secrecy within 
a given population for survival.  Professor Gordon McCormick describes secrecy as the 
insurgent’s only advantage over conventional military forces.102  Secrecy allows both 
organized crime families and insurgent organizations to operate within a given 
population. 
Both Trinquier and Horne continually refer to the ALN as a clandestine 
organization, providing evidence for the secrecy of this organization.  Trinquier confirms 
the secrecy of the ALN in the statement, “Yassef Saadi. . . was able to install himself 
within 200 yards of the office of the army commandant of the Algiers sector and remain 
there without being found for several months before his arrest.”103  The secrecy of the 
organization is also evident in its cell structure at its lowest level.  This prevented 
members at the lowest level from knowing other individuals within the organization or 
having a good picture of the group as a whole.   
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102 Professor Gordon McCormick, Department of Defense Analysis, class notes from SO3802. 
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Organized crime families rely on secrecy for the same reasons as insurgent 
organizations: security.  Edward Allen describes this in the book Merchants of Menace:  
The Mafia in which he states, “[i]ts success depends upon its anonymity, upon its ability 
to remain undiscovered.”104  He continues by stating that, “it may be said with accuracy 
that the Mafia is a secret society.”105  Joseph Pistone’s testimony before the 1988 
Committee on Governmental Affairs also provides evidence for this conclusion.  Donald 
Cressey also confirms the secrecy of organized crime in the statement, “[t]he ongoing 
activities of organized criminals simply are not accessible to observation by the ordinary 
citizen or the ordinary social scientist.”106  Abadnisky also provides evidence for the 
secrecy within organized crime in the statement, “[d]ecentralization in a criminal 
organization is advantageous for both business and security reasons.”107  The secrecy of 
organized crime is dependent upon the population and the rules under which the 
organization operates.  Without secrecy, law enforcement would be able to completely 
target organized crime families, gather sufficient evidence and eliminate their 
organizations.  Organized crime must maintain secrecy in order to operate and continue 
its existence. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
There are several other analogies that can be made between organized crime and 
insurgencies that are not covered in this thesis, but could provide further areas for study.   
Cohesive and bonding mechanisms are one area of possible study that could provide 
useful insights for applying law enforcement social control methods to counterinsurgency 
operations.  Ethnicity and unit cohesion within organized crime families and 
insurgencies, either through family or ethnic linkages or through societal ones such as 
prison time, are another.  Phil Williams, an expert on transnational criminal networks, 
describes this type of cohesion in the statement, 
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bonding will be directly related to family or kinship. . . Other bonding 
mechanisms include ethnicity and common experience in which 
participants develop a strong sense of trust and mutual reliance.  
Membership in youth gangs or time spent together in prison can also 
provide critical bonding mechanisms.108 
Prison, ethnic similarities and family ties are also strong cohesive mechanisms within 
insurgency groups.109  The ALN developed along similar lines, recruiting from within 
prisons and Arab ethnicities in the Casbah.110 
The analogy that organized crime is similar to a system of government with its 
own leaders, rules, and enforcement mechanisms similar to insurgency groups and their 
position as the “anti-state” is another area for possible further study.111  As Donald 
Cressey in Theft of the Nation describes the position of  criminal family leaders, “[t]he 
bosses succeed in part because they are controllers of a large business enterprise, as well 
as the rulers of an illicit government.”112  Hugh Barlow, a sociology professor at 
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, also demonstrates the similarity between 
organized crime and government in the statement, “[o]rganized crime has been likened to 
government in this sense; not only do syndicates create their own rules, but like states, 
have their own machinery for enforcing them and their own methods of doing it.”113  
Both organized crime families and insurgencies have their own forms of government, 
either for their own day to day operations as with organized crime or as a means to 
replace the existing form of government as with an insurgency.114   
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The use of violence as an enforcement mechanism is another area where we see 
analogies between organized crime and insurgencies.  Both organizations use violence 
either for their own enforcement of rules or to control the local population and maintain 
their positions of power and control within the community.  The use of violence and its 
effect as a social control mechanism is another area for further research and possible 
applicable analogies. 
The strategy of targeting an entire organization rather than the leader is an area 
that merits further study.  The French in Algeria used this strategy to effectively destroy 
the ALN during the Battle of Algiers, and the FBI strategy against organized crime 
follows a similar methodology.  Although the context of both organizations is different, 
their similarities merit further study as to the general applicability of this strategy. 
Another area for further study is the use of informants and undercover agents 
against both organized crime families and insurgent groups.  The French effectively used 
a secret network of informants under Roger Trinquier to outline the structure of the FLN.  
Joseph Pistone’s position within the Bonanno Family in New York and his testimony 
demonstrates the applicability of undercover operatives to organized crime families.  
Although the tactical situation may not allow this type of operation, the importance that 
insiders play in determining the complete structure of either organized crime families or 
insurgent organizations merits further analysis and comparison. 
In collecting data on both organized crime families and the ALN, data was found 
supporting the use of social control mechanisms by both organizations.  The ALN used 
both violence and other non-coercive mechanisms in order to gain control of the 
population of the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers.  Joseph Pistone’s testimony 
describes the effects of organized crime’s social control mechanism within the 
neighborhoods of New York (see Chapter I).  The similarities between both organizations 
merit further study in order to provide a complete and valid analogy between both 




This thesis analyzed one insurgent organization and the crime families of New 
York and found comparisons between the two.  Further studies on other insurgent 
organizations and other organized crime families are needed to completely confirm the 
results found in this thesis.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to show that there were valid organizational 
analogies between organized crime families and insurgencies.  This study specifically 
focused on the similarities in command structure and the secrecy of the La Cosa Nostra 
crime families in New York and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) of the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the Casbah.  By showing that there are valid analogies 
between both organized crime and insurgency organizations, further studies can be 
conducted on the complete applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military 
operations and their feasibility in the Army’s emerging counterinsurgency doctrine.   
There are organizational similarities between both organized crime in America 
and insurgencies.  By understanding these similarities and the context in which they exist, 
it may be possible to expand the current counterinsurgency doctrine to include anti-
organized crime techniques that are relevant to the tactical situation.  The study of 
organized crime also provides commanders in the field the ability to make the correct 
linkages between organized crime families and insurgent organizations and to refine their 
intelligence collection based on a structural knowledge of these organizations. 
By analyzing historical data from La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York 
and comparing them to the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957, this thesis has shown 
that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between the two.  Both 
insurgencies and organized crime families organize themselves as secret societies with 
similar hierarchical command structures.  This is done both for survival within a 
population and for operational needs based on the environment, such as a particular 
ethnically homogeneous neighborhood in either New York or in the Casbah of Algiers.  
For survival, both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from 
authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military.  Both 
must also maintain anonymity within the civilian population in order to conduct their 
business.   
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This thesis has shown the importance of knowing the organization’s command 
structure within organized crime families and insurgencies.  Knowing the social context 
of either organized crime families or insurgencies may not be enough to break down their 
organizations.  By knowing the command structure as well as the social conditions, 
commanders can then target the correct individuals within these organizations and attack 
the organization as a whole. 
The strategy of targeting the entire organization is applicable to both insurgent 
organizations and organized crime families.  By targeting the entire network and not just 
the individual members, military commanders can focus their efforts against insurgent 
organizations and apply the appropriate law enforcement and military tactics, techniques 
and procedures.  The analogies between organized crime in America and insurgent 
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